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RECENT DECISIONS
Wrongful Death of a Stillborn Infant-Lawence v. Craven Tire Co.
At common law when a harm was inflicted which gave rise to a
cause of action in tort, the action either died with the injured party,
or if pending, abated with his death.' Today by statute, the personal
representative of the decedent is given a cause of action for wrongful
death.2
A recent expansion of this concept has been to allow recovery for
injuries negligently inflicted upon an unborn child, resulting in still'See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moses, 287 U.S. 530 (1933); Partee v. St. Louis &
S.F.R.R., 204 F. 970 (8th Cir. 1913); Sonner v. Cordano, 228 F. Supp. 435 (D. Nev.
1963); Ivey v. Wiggins, 276 Ala. 106, 159 So. 2d 618 (1964); Anderson v. Anderson,
211 Tenn. 566, 366 S.W.2d 755 (1963); Bums v. Brickle, 106 Ga. App. 150, 126 S.E.2d
633 (1962); Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955); Minkin v. Minkin,
336 Pa. 49, 7 A.2d 461 (1939); Storrs v. Mech, 166 Md. 124, 170 A. 743 (1934); Porter
v. Sorell, 280 Mass. 457, 182 N.E. 837 (1932); Braun v. Riel, 40 S.V.2d 621 (Mo.
1931); Borde v. Osborne, 155 Wash. 585, 285 P. 425 (1930); Dow v. Legg, 120 Neb.
271, 231 N.W. 747 (1930); Krause v. Rarity, 210 Cal. 644, 293 P. 62 (1930); Debus v.
Cook, 198 Ind. 675, 154 N.E. 484 (1926); Goodyear v. Davis, 114 Kan. 557, 220 P. 282
(1923); Smith v. Odd Fellows Bldg. Ass'n., 46 Nev. 48, 205 P. 796 (1922); Nolan v.
Moore, 81 Fla. 594, 88 So. 601 (1920); Sharrow v. Inland Lines, Ltd., 214 N.Y. 101,
108 N.E. 217 (1915); Christilly v. Warner, 87 Conn. 461, 88 A. 711 (1913); Dougherty
v. American McKenna Process Co., 255 I1. 369, 99 N.E. 619 (1912); Stevenson v.
W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., 108 Va. 575, 62 S.E. 351 (1908); Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp.
493, 170 Eng.Rep. 1033 (1808).
2See, e.g., Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913); Sacks v. Creasy,
211 F. Supp. 859 (E.D. Pa. 1962); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Reed Constr.
Corp., 149 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1963); Gray v. Goodson, 61 Wash. 2d 319, 378 P.2d 413
(1963); Buie v. Hester, 147 So. 2d 733 (La. App. 1962); Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn.
347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961); Lindley v. Sink, 218 Ind. 1, 30 N.E.2d 456 (1940); State
ex rel. Dunnigan v. Cobourn, 171 Md. 23, 187 A. 881 (1936); Porter v. Sorell, 280
Mass. 457, 182 N.E. 837 (1932); Ghilain v. Couture, 84 N.H. 48, 146 A. 395 (1929);
Brookshire v. Burkhart, 141 Okla. 1, 283 P. 571 (1929); White v. Atchinson, T. &
S.F.R.R., 125 Kan. 537, 265 P. 73 (1928); Regan v. Davis, 290 Pa. 167, 138 A. 751
(1927); Swope v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 78 W. Va. 517, 89 S.E. 284 (1916);
McFarland v. Oregon Elec. R.R., 70 Ore. 27, 138 P. 458 (1914); Buel v. United R.R.,
248 Mo. 126, 154 S.V. 71 (1913); Bond v. United R.R.'s of San Francisco, 159 Cal. 270,
113 P. 366 (1911).
The wrongful death statutes in the United States are modeled after Lord Campbell's
Act. The Act provides that whenever the death of any person is caused by the wrongful
act, neglect, or default of another, in such a manner as would have entitled the
party injured to have sued had death not ensued, an action may be maintained in the
name of the executor or administrator for the benefit of certain relatives. 9 & 10
Vict., Ch. 93 (1846).
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birth.3 Most of these decisions permitting recovery have applied to
3 See Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.W. Va. 1969); White v. Yup,
... Nev. ... , 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Orange v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443
S.W.2d 650 (Ky. 1969); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mu. Auto Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148
N.W.2d 107 (1967); Leal v. C. C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.
1967); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Fowler v.
Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234
Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Gorke v.
Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962); Stidarn v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App.
431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957);
Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. (11 Terry) 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Porter
v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901
(Ky. 1955); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); Valence v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1951). See generally Pan-American
Casualty Co. v. Reed, 240 F.2d 336 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 819 (1957).
A controlling influence in the trend to permit recovery has been the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Boggs in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 IM.359, 56 N.E. 639,
641 (1900). Justice Boggs concluded:
[Wihenever a child in utero is so far advanced in prenatal age as that, should
parturition by natural or artificial means occur at such age where such child
could and would live separately from the mother, and grow into the ordinary
activities of life, and is afterward born and becomes a living human being,
such child has a right of action for any injuries wantonly or negligently inflicted upon his or her person at such age of viability, though then in the womb
of the mother. Id. at 642.
The first American jurisdiction to extend a right of action to the personal representative of a stillborn child was Minnesota. In its decision the court held that the
special administrator of the estate of the unborn infant, which died before birth from
injuries inflicted upon it, had a cause of action on behalf of the decedents next of
kin under the wrongful death statute. Viability of the child was a requisite for recovery.
Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
Some courts have taken the view that an unborn viable child capable of existing inde.
pendently from its mother, when injuries are wrongfully inflicted upon it, may after
birth, maintain an action for such injuries. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138
(D.C. Cir. 1946); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288, 367 P.2d 835
(1962); Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Serv, Inc., 210 Tenn. 384, 358 S.W.2d 471
(1962); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); La Blue v. Specker, 358
Mich. 558, 100 N.W'.2d 445 (1960); Keyes v. Construction Serv, Inc., 340 Mass. 633,
165 N.E.2d 912 (1960); Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d
163 (1959); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Hornbuckle v.
Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205
Ore. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955); Prates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 487,
118 A.2d 633 (1955); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953); Jasinsky
v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit,
Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949); Scott v. McPheters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629,
92 P.2d 678, ajl'd per curiam, 93 P.2d 562 (1939); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La.
App. 1923). The key factor in these decisions is "life". The child must at some point
be alive outside the mother's womb, regardless of how long it is. In a recent Massachusetts decision it was held that a wrongful death action would lie on behalf of a
child that was injured during gestation and lived only two and one-half hours.
Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967).
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viable fetuses.4 However, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in
Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 5 recently decided that no cause of action
exists in such an instance.
In Lawrence, the plaintiff's wife, pregnant with a viable child, was
a passenger in a vehicle involved in a collision due to the negligence
of one of the defendants. The prenatal child received injuries which
impeded its development, thereby resulting in stillbirth. The court,
in denying recovery, held that a viable fetus is not considered a "person" within the wrongful death statute,6 and that no common law action can be maintained by a child en ventre sa mere.
There have been several reasons for disallowing a right of action
for the wrongful death of a stillborn child. The reason most frequently
adhered to is based on economic considerations 7 in that no pecuniary
4 See Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964); Wendt v. Lillo,
182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960); White v. Yup, - Nev. -, 458 P.2d 617 (1969);
Orange v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 650 (Ky. 1969); Kwaterski v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967); Hatala v.
Marldewicz. 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Fowler v. Woodward, 244
S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); State ex. rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198
A.2d 71 (1964); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Gorke v. Le Clerc,
23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962); Stidan v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167
N.E.2d 106 (1959); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. (11 Terry) 258, 128 A.2d
557 (1956); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss.
269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949);
Annor., 15 A.L.R.3d 1004 (1967).
A viable fetus is one that has reached such a stage of development that it can live
outside the uterus. J. ScHMIDT, AirORNEY's DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE 870 (1968); T.
MONTAGO, PRENATAL INFLUENCES

398 (1962); B. MALOY,

MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR LAWYERS

706 (1960).
To extend the right of recovery to include prenatal injuries incurred prior to
viability would create a difficult problem of proof of causation and results would be
based chiefly on speculation. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF nm LAW OF TORTS 356 (3d
ed. 1964); Reed, Prenatal Injuries, Development of the Right of Recovery, 10 DEFENSE
L.J. 29, 46 (1961); Del Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts, 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 61,65
(1960); 18 VAND.L. Rxv. 847, 853 (1965).
5210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
'aVA. CODE ANN. §

7

8-633 (Cum. Supp. 1968).

See Goodrich v. Moore, 8 Mich. App. 725, 155 N.W.2d 247 (1967); Endresz v.
Friedberg, 52 Misc. 2d 693, 276 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 28 App. Div. 1085,
285 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1967), aff'd mem. 21 N.Y.2d 743, 234 N.E.2d 842, 287 N.Y.S.2d 888
(1968); Marko v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966). But see
Gullborg v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964); In re Bradley's Estate, 50 Misc. 2d 72,
269 N.Y.S.2d 657 (Sur. Ct. 1966); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425
(1966); Acton v. Shields, 386 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. App. 1965); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J.
303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); In re Logan's Estate, 4 Misc. 2d 283, 156 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Sur.
Cr.), aff'd mern., 2 App. Div. 2d 842, 156 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1956), aff'd mem., 3 N.Y.2d
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loss exists on which recovery can be based, due to the unavailability of
evidence that the child would have contributed financially to its beneficiaries." Thus, any damages would necessarily be founded upon conjecture, it being difficult, as a matter of law, to prove pecuniary loss
resulting from such a deathY Nevertheless, it is only appropriate that
a family which has suffered such a grevious loss should receive remuneration.' 0
Recovery has also been denied in preference to fostering fictitious
claims," since any right of action would be founded on speculation
that the prenatal injury was the cause of death.' 2 However, the advancedevelopment of adequate safement of medical science has led to the
3

guards against such fraudulent claims.'

Some jurisdictions have denied recovery because a child born dead
800, 144 N.E.2d 644, 166 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957). See generally S. SParsER, RxcovERY FOR
WRONGmL DEATH § 4:31 (1966).
In Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954), the court stated:
Considering the highly speculative nature of the pecuniary value of an
unborn child . . . it is apparent that practically everything that could be
recovered in an action for the death of an unborn child can now be recovered
by the mother in connection with her own claim for general damages. Id. at 180.
8
See note 7 supra.
o Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140,144 (1964). In its decision the court
recognized that the younger the child is, the more speculative the damages become:
On the death of a very young child . . . at least some facts can be shown to
aid in estimating damages as, for example, its mental and physical condition.
But not even these scant proofs can be offered when the child is stillborn. It
is virtually impossible to predict whether the unborn child, but for its death,
would have been capable of giving pecuniary benefit to its survivors.
10 See Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.W. Va. 1969); White v. Yup,
... Nev. ... , 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Kwatersld v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224

A.2d 406 (1966).
11

See Stoles v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 202 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1967); Gay v. Thompson,
266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140
(1964); Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963); Norman v. Murphy,
124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954).

12 See Powers v. City of Troy, 380 Mich. 160, 156 N.W.2d 530 (1968); Gay v.

Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204
A.2d 140 (1964); Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963); Hogan v.
McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958); Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d

95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347,
78 S.XV.2d 944 (1935); Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108
So. 566 (1926).
13 See White v. Yup, ... Nev. ... , 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Kwatersli v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967); In re Bradley's Estate,
50 Misc. 2d 72, 269 N.Y.S.2d 657 (Sur. Ct. 1966); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 266 Conn. Supp.
358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Rainey v.
Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on
the Law Relating to PrenatalInjuries, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 553 (1962).
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had no right of action at common law for prenatal injuries; 14 thus, no
right of action can be transmitted to its personal representative under

the wrongful death statute. 5 The Lawrence court acknowledged this
reasoning in its decision. If the law recognizes unborn children sufficiently to protect them against the crimes of others,' 6 in addition to
conserving their inheritance1 r and property rights,' 8 it should also recognize their separate existence for the purpose of redressing torts.' 9
14 See Padillow v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 216 (Okla. 1967); Carroll v. Skoff, 415 Pa. 47,
202 A.2d 9 (1964); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.'A-.2d 221 (1958); Howell
v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d
577 (1953); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Newman
v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
' 8 See Padillow v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 216 (Okla. 1967); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn.
235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958); Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953); Steggall v.
Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co, 155 Neb.
17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 1059 (1950); Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1256
(1953); Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 992 (1967).
I'See generally Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962); Poliquin
v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); State v. Siciliano, 21 N.J. 249,
121 A.2d 490 (1956); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 261 P.2d 225 (1955); Porter v.
Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 67 A.2d 141
(1949); Passley v. State, 194 Ga. 327, 21 S.E.2d 230 (1942); Guiffrida v. State, 61 Ga.
App. 595, 7 S.E.2d 34 (1940); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923); State v.
Atwood, 54 Ore. 526, 102 P. 295 (1909); Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671 (1898).
17See, e.g., Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962); Poliquin v.
MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Lane v. Hatfield, 173 Ore. 79, 143
P.2d 230 (1943); Thomson v. Elliott, 152 Misc. 188, 273 N.Y.S. 898 (Child. Ct. 1934);
Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923); Tomlin v. Laws, 301 IIl. 616, 134
N.E. 24 (1922); Chandler v. Chandler, 147 Ga. 561, 94 S.E. 995 (1918); Scull v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co, 132 N.C. 30, 43 S.E. 504 (1903); Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.)
255 (1834.)
I8 See, e.g., Turnett v. Keaton, 266 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1959); Mallison v. Pomeroy,
205 Ore. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d
678 (1939); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944
(1935); Chester Park Co. v. Schulte, 120 Ohio St. 273, 166 N.E. 13 (1929); Stanford v.
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926); Cooper v. Blanck, 39
So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923); Ramey v. Ramey, 195 Ky. 673, 243 S.W. 934 (1922);
Scott v. Radiff, 179 Ky. 267, 200 S.W. 462 (1918); Heath v. Heath, 114 N.C. 547,
19 S.E. 155 (1894).
1' See Gullborg v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964); Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co,
341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d
14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967); Leal v. C. C. Pitts Sand & Gravel Inc, 419 S.W. 2d 820
(Tex. 1967); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Hale v. Manion,
189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448
(1962); Stidan v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Poliquin v.
MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72
So. 2d 434 (1954); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
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The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in quoting from a treatise °
to interpret the wrongful death statute,2 1 deleted the following essential
passage from its reference:
Legislative words derive vitality from the obvious purposes for which
the statutes are enacted, and in the interpretation of a statute of
ambiguous terminology, the proper course is to adopt that sense of
the words which promotes in the fullest manner the object of the
22
statute.
At this juncture in the opinion the court began:
The general rule, as to this matter, is that the words of a statute
should receive their ordinary acceptation and significance, where such
construction is consonant, and not at variance with the purpose of
the statute, and does not thwart or defeat the same, or where it is
not obvious from the statute that the evil to be suppressed, or the
remedy to be advanced, requires that the construction be limited or
enlarged.23

To include a prenatal viable child within the meaning of "person"
promotes the purpose of the Virginia wrongful death statute, and requires that the intent of the statute be enlarged. The distorted allusion
to the meaning of "person" by the court narrowed the extent to which

the word could be construed so that the quoted explanation would
coincide with its opinion.
Denying recovery because the prenatal infant is not a "person" imposes a stipulation that an actual birth must precede any consideration
of a right of action for the child's subsequent death.2 4 It is illogical to
Ams. Jtm., Statutes § 307 (1942).
§ 8-633 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
2250 Ams. Ju.r, Statutes § 307 (1942) (emphasis added).
2350 Am. Jtt., Statutes § 307 (1942). The court could have located a basis for allowing a viable prenatal infant to be considered a "person" by referring to additional excerpts within the same treatise section:
On the other hand, the rule that words of a statute are to be taken in their
ordinary sense yields when necessary to effectuate the real purpose of the lawgiver,
or whenever the case is clearly within the mischief sought to be prevented, and
it is proper to depart from the usual and natural, or literal, meaning of words
used in a statute where the application of the literal or commonly accepted
meaning. would operate to defeat the purpose of the statute. Under this rule,
the motive upon which the legislature proceeded, or the end in view, or the
purpose for which the statute was designed, may operate to extend or enlarge
words of a narrow signification, or to restrain words of a general signification.
(emphasis added).
24 Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 202 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1967); In re Bradley's
20 50
21

VA. CODE ANY.
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allow recovery to depend upon whether death from fatal injuries occurs before or after birth.2 5 A viable child is an entity that can live

and grow, mentally and physically, if separated prematurely from
the mother, 26 and it is contradictory to deny this living being the right
Estate, 50 Misc. 2d 72, 269 N.Y.S.2d 657 (Sur. Ct. 1966); Keyes v. Construction Serv, Inc,
340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d
221 (1958). See Powers v. City of Troy, 380 Mich. 160, 156 N.W.2d 530 (1968);
Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963); Greenberg v. Stanley, 30
N.J. 485, 153 A.2d 833 (1959); Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178
(1954); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Smith v.
Luckhardt, 299 111. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939). See generally Goodrich v. Moore,
8 Mich. App. 725, 155 N.W.2d 247 (1967); Padillow v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (Okla.
1967); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Occhipinti v. Rheem
Mfg. Co., 252 Miss. 172, 172 So. 2d 186 (1965); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d
140 (1964); Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Serv., Inc., 210 Tenn. 384, 358 S.W.2d
471 (1962); Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y.
220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); Finer v. Nichols, 138 S.W. 889 (Mo. 1911).
25
See Gullborg v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964); Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co,
341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964); Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.W.Va.
1969); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960); White v. Yup, ... Nev ... ,
458 P.2d 617 (1969); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148
N.W.2d 107 (1967); Leal v. C. C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967);
Fowler v. Woodward, 224 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143,
368 P.2d 1 (1962); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Stidan v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, 50 Del.
(11 Terry) 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d
838 (1949).
That recovery for prenatal injuries should be denied and the wrongdoer exculpated
solely because the injuries negligently inflicted were sufficiently severe to produce
the death of the unborn child has been described as an "absurd" result. Stidan v.
Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959).
26 Orange v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Ky. 1969); White
v. Yup, ... Nev. ... , 458 P.2d 617, 620 (1969); Torrigan v. Watertown News Co, 352
Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926, 928 (1967); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358,
224 A.2d 406, 407 (1966); Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448, 451
(1962); Stidan v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959); Poliquin v.
MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249, 251 (1957); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269,
72 So. 2d 434, 439 (1954). See Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.W. Va.
1969); Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F.
Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. Cir. 1946); State
ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga.
App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d
847 (La. App. 1951). See generally Acton v. Shields, 386 S.XVV.2d 363 (Mo. 1965);
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962); Prates v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 487, 118 A.2d 633 (1955); Amann v. Faidy,
415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
It has also been held that a child injured during the prenatal period could recover
for wrongfully inflicted injuries even if not "viable". However, a live birth was
necessary. Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958).
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to come under the aegis of the wrongful death statutes as a "person"
within their meaning and intent.27
Refusal to grant a remedy in stillbirth cases is unjustified because the
conduct is no different than if the victim were in esse at the time of the
injury.2 1 The increasing recognition of a right of action for wrongful
death of a stillborn infant" creates a need for modification by judicial
27 See Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964); Panagopoulous v.
Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.W. Va. 1969); White v. Yup, - Nev. -, 458 P.2d 617
(1969); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107
(1967); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Fowler v.
Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368
P.2d 1 (1962); Stidan v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Porter v.
Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co, 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1951); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d
838 (1949).
28See Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.W. Va. 1969); White v. Yup,
... Nev. ... , 459 P.2d 617 (1969); Orange v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443
S.W.2d 650 (Ky. 1969); Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d
926 (1967); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d
107 (1967); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 N.E.2d 42 (1964); Stidan v.
Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn.
365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949). See generally Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska
1962); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 228 A.2d 406 (1966); Gorke v.
Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H.
104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); Valence
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co, 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1951); Amann v. Faidy, 415
1. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
29 One federal circuit court has allowed recovery because to do so corresponded to
the weight of authority. Gullborg v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964). A federal
district court has indicated that recovery would be allowed as a result of the overwhelming trend today. Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960).
Eleven jurisdictions expressly prohibit a right of action for the wrongful death of a
viable unborn fetus. Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969);
Goodrich v. Moore, 8 Mich. App. 725, 155 N.W.2d 247 (1967); Stokes v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 202 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1967); Padillow v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (Okla. 1967);
In re Bradley's Estate, 50 Misc. 2d 72, 269 N.Y.S.2d 657 (Sur. Ct. 1966); Gay v.
Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Graf v. Taggert, 43 NJ. 303, 204 A.2d
140 (1964); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964). But see Gullborg v. Rizzo,
331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964); Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963);
Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil
Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951). In Drabbels, the court based its decision
primarily on lack of precedent. Since that time the majority of states have provided
adequate precedent, and the language of the Drabbels decision indicated that if there
were precedent in other states, the court would follow.
Fifteen jurisdictions have held that an action for the wrongful death of an unborn
child is maintainable where the fetus was viable at the time of injury. Panagopoulous
v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.W. Va. 1969); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56
(N.D. Iowa 1960); White v. Yup, - Nev. -, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Orange v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 650 (Ky. 1969); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967); Fowler v. Woodward, 244
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administration, or in the alternative, legislative amendment of the wrongful death statutes in those jurisdictions not acknowledging such right of
action.
The Virginia General Assembly has extended the meaning of "person" to embrace bodies politic and corporate as well as individuals.30 A
further augmentation to include a prenatal viable child within the
meaning of "person" is necessary and logical.

E.L.C.

S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d
71 (1964); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23
Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962); Stidan v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167
N.E.2d 106 (1959); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Worgan
v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. (11 Terry) 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Porter v.
Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d
434 (1954); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949). The trend
of authority is toward allowing recovery for fatal prenatal injuries resulting in stillbirth. The courts are recognizing the fact that a viable prenatal child is an entity that
is entitled to be protected as is every other person.
The question as to the right of recovery for the loss of a child has also arisen in
cases involving personal injuries resulting in a miscarriage. While such injuries are
actionable, and compensation should be awarded for physical and mental suffering, it is
generally held that no recovery can be had for the death of the unborn child. See, e.g.,
Berg v. New York Soc'y, 136 N.Y.S.2d 528 (Sup. Ct. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 286
App. Div. 783, 146 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1955); Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435, 132 P.2d 114
(1942); Malone v. Monongahela Valley Traction Co., 104 W. Va. 417, 140 SE. 340
(1927); Wallace v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 88 Ore. 221, 170 P. 283 (1918);
Hosty v. Moulton Water Co., 39 Mont. 310, 102 P. 568 (1909); Witrack v. Nassau
Elec. Ry., 52 App. Div. 234, 65 N.Y.S. 257 (1900); Thomas v. Gates, 126 Cal. 1, 58
P. 315 (1899); Western Union v. Cooper, 71 Tex. 507, 9 SW. 598 (1888).
30
VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.19 (1966).

Right to Counsel at Pre-trial Photographic Identification-United
States v. Collins
The right of the accused to have the assistance of counsel at his
criminal trial is clearly recognized both at the federal1 and state 2 level.
The application of this right to other proceedings, particularly those
before trial, has vexed the courts of this country ever since the Supreme
Court ruled that an accused person shall have the guidance of counsel
at every step of the proceedings against him. 3 A pretrial confrontation
merely for identification purposes between the accused and the prosecution can "settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere
formality." To meet this possibility the right to assistance of counsel
has been extended to critical stages of the proceedings. 5
Concentrating on pretrial identification procedures, the Supreme
7 has held a
Court in United States v. Wade" and Gilbert v. California
"'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U. S. Cosr. amend. VI. This right was
developed in the federal courts in a series of three cases. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60 (1942). Today this right is embodied in FED. R. CrM. P. 44(a) which
provides: "Every defendant who is unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have
counsel assigned to represent him at every stage of the proceedings from his initial
appearance before the commissioner or the court through appeal, unless he waives such
appointment." See also Comment, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel
During Police Interrogation,73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1003 (1964).
2Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Prior to this decision the right to
counsel in state courts was guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, as well as by state constitutional provisions. Cf. Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S.
633 (1959); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335
U.S. 437 (1948). All states have provisions similar to the sixth amendment in their
constitutions except Virginia where the "law of the land" clause has been held to embrace the right to counsel. Fitzgerald v. Smyth, 194 Va. 681, 74 S.E.2d 810 (1953).
Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 351, 46 S.E.2d 413 (1948).
3 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
4 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
5 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation); Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (custodial interrogation); White v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 59 (1963) (pleading before a Maryland magistrate); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52 (1961) (arraignment under Alabama law). For cases holding certain stages
not to be critical see, e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (taking of handwriting exemplars); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (systematic taking of
fingerprints and blood samples, plus examination of clothing and hair); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (taking of blood test to determine alcohol content).
But see Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1969), which held a suspect had a right
to counsel at the taking of handwriting samples under the constitution of Alaska.
6 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
7 388 U.S. 263 (1967). The application of these decisions is limited to lineups occurring
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post-indictment lineup to be a critical stage at which the accused has
the right to counsel. The Court in broad sweeping phrases referred to
the possible prejudicial nature of such identifications, 8 but failed to
state that the rulings are strictly applicable to lineups. 9 The novelty of
this rationale, coupled with an indefiniteness as to its applicability, 10 has
led to many cases attempting to delineate the extent of the decisions."
One such case is United States v. Collins.'2 On the day Collins was
arrested for the robbery of a federally insured bank he was identified
as the robber by one of three government eyewitnesses at a lineup conducted in the presence of counsel. Later, in the absence of Collins and
his counsel, the other two witnesses identified him from photographs
of the lineup. None of the witnesses could make an in-court identification of Collins because he had lost seventy-five pounds during the ten
month interim between the lineup and the trial.'8 Collins was convicted
only after the District Judge admitted testimony of the pretrial identification on the grounds that there was complete spontaneity in the
witnesses' decisions at the lineup and the presentation of the pictures.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction
by refusing to extend Wade and Gilbert to the photographic identifi4
cations of Collins.'
after June 12, 1967. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (decided concurrently with
Wade and Gilbert).
8See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-35 (1967). See The Supreme Court,
1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv.69, 180-82 (1967).
9 See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 180-82 (1967); 67 Nw.
U.L. REv. 251, 257-59 (1968).
10 The Supreme Court set forth several reasons for holding a lineup to be a critical
stage. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-35 (1967). These same reasons could, in
appropriate situations, be applied to other pretrial identification procedures.
11 Some courts have avoided the issue by applying the prospective rule of Stovall.
See, e.g., United States v. Black, 412 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Marson,
408 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1968), criticized in 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1019 (1968); Wise v.
United States, 383 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
12 416 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1969).
13 A fourth eyewitness, who was unable to identify Collins positively at the corporal
lineup, the photographic display, or at trial, was called by the defense.
14 Inan attempt to bolster its decision, the Fourth Circuit also relied upon Simmons
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). Simmons was identified by photographs as the
robber of a federally insured bank before he was arrested. The Supreme Court, in
refusing to void Simmons' conviction, laid down a test to be applied to photographic
identifications before the accused is in custody. "[E]ach case must be considered on
its own facts, and . . .convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following
a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the
photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to
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The right to counsel at pretrial identification procedures other than
lineups has been upheld in many cases subsequent to Wade and Gilbert.'6 Various arguments, .such as causing delay in prompt identification and obstructing the confrontations, 16 have been made to deny the
a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Id. at 384. This test is
an application of the "totality of circumstances" test set down in Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967): "[A] claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of
a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it . . . ..
Id. at 302. The Fourth Circuit applied both tests and found no imperiling circumstances or impermissible suggestiveness in the showing of the photographs to the two
witnesses.
Two elements are essential in an application of the Simnons test: the accused
must not be in custody and there must be an in-court identification. As was pointed
out by Judge Winter in his dissent, the majority in Collins made such an application
in the absence of these two factors. Other courts, in an effort to find an easy solution
to the prejudice problem in photographic identifications, have overlooked the same
requirements, especially the pre-arrest-post-arrest distinction. See, e.g., Barber v.
United States, 412 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1969); Rech v. United States, 410 F.2d 1131
(10th Cir. 1969). This is not the first time the Fourth Circuit has failed to note this
distinction. See United States v. Marson, 408 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1968). However, a
recent decision applied Simmons correctly to a pre-arrest situation. United States v.
Butler,
405 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1968) (opinion by Judge Winter). . 15 See, e.g., Mason v. United States, 414 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1969); People v.
Bryant, 60 Misc. 2d 808, 304 N.YS.2d 24 (Nassau County Ct. 1969) (informal unsupervised gatherings); People v. Fowler, 271 A.C.A. 214, 76 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969); People
v. C., 32 App. Div. 2d 840, 303 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (pre-indictment lineups);
People v. Martin, 273 A.C.A. 724, 78 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1969); Commonwealth v. Cooper,
- Mass. -, 248 N.E.2d 253 (1969) (identification through one way mirrors). But
see Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Gilmore,
398 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1968); Cox v. State, 219 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1969) (video tape replays
for witnesses); Watson v. State, 7 Md. App. 225, 255 A.2d 103 (1969) (one to one
confrontations between the accused and witnesses) State v. Williams, 6 N.C. App.
14, 169 S.E. 2d 231 (1969) (no right to counsel where witness viewed the accused
through a one way mirror merely to determine if the police had in custody the man
the witness had previously described).
Several cases have held such confrontations under proper circumstances not to
violate due process. See, e.g., Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404 (1968); Clemons v.
United States, 408 F.2d 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Hanks v. United States, 388 F.2d
171 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 863 (1968).
The right to counsel, however, is not usually applied to on-the-scene identifications.
Solomon v. United States, 408 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Russell v. United States, 408
F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Kennedy v. United States. 353 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
United States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Commonwealth v. Bumpus,
354 Mass. 494, 238 NE.2d 343 (1968). But see United States v. Kinnard, 294 F. Supp.
286 (D.D.C. 1968) (reluctant granting of a motion to suppress testimony of an on-thescene identification with no counsel present). One court has also refused the right
to counsel at a reenactment of the crime. People v. McClellan, 71 A.C. 831, 457 P.2d
871, 80 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1969).
16 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237-38 (1967). See also Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 480-81 (1966).
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right to counsel at such pretrial identifications. 17 Although the right
to counsel usually means the suspect's own counsel, the Supreme Court
has suggested that substitute counsel may be justified to prevent a
delay in identification, reasoning that any counsel may eliminate the
hazards that make the lineup critical.' 8 Counsel will not obstruct such
procedures because he is merely protecting the rights of his client, 19 and,
in essence, acting as a policeman's policeman.20
The Fourth Circuit did not discuss the underlying premises for and
against counsel at such pretrial identification proceedings, but strictly
construed Wade to deal only with the peculiar features of a lineup.2 '
The Supreme Court in deciding Wade and Gilbert placed much emphasis on the inability of the defense to reconstruct at trial the manner
of identification at the lineup.22 Counsel is required to preserve the most
basic right of the criminal defendant-his right to a fair trial at which
witnesses against him can be cross-examined meaningfully.23 Implicit in
17 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has gone so far as to say pre-arrest proceedings are investigatory and not critical, therefore counsel is not required. State v.
Butler, Me., 256 A.2d 588 (1969).
18 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 n. 27 (1967).
'9 Id. at 238. See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480-81 (1966).
20See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. RF-v. 69, 176-78 (1967); 63 Nw.
UJ. REv. 251, 259 (1968). The additional problem of forcing the prosecution to
reveal the identity of certain witnesses it wishes to conceal can be averted by having
the witnesses wear masks. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 238 n. 28 (1967).
There also may be an infringement upon the state's power to investigate outside the
presence of counsel, but counsel may help eliminate any taint upon the prosecution's
identification evidence. Id. at 238. Another hazard to be considered is the ethical
problem that may arise when the only way the prejudice observed by counsel at a
lineup can be brought out at trial is by counsel taking the stand. See 63 Nw. UI..
REv. 251, 259 (1968).
21 Judge Bryan, speaking for the majority, said:
These authorities do not condemn all identifications not made through a lineup.
That is not the lesson of Wade and Gilbert. The Court there dealt with inescapable features of a lineup, and its demand for counsel was unconditional solely
because of these unavoidably indwelling and peculiar circumstances. It did not
pretend to outlaw, per se, those means of identification which are not fraught
with these or like potential dangers.
United States v. Collins, 416 F.2d 696, 699 (4th Cir. 1969).
22 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-32 (1967).
23 In Collins the majority formulated the major issue of the case as follows: "The
question, then, is whether under Wade and Gilbert the presence of counsel was mandatory-to insure against a breach of due process-when the pictures of the lineup are
[sic] first laid before the lineup absentees." (emphasis added). United States v.
Collins, 416 F.2d 696, 699 (4th Cir. 1969). Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority in Wade, did not mention that counsel should be present to prevent a violation
of due process. Counsel was required to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial
with its features of confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses.
A possible basis for the Fourth Circuit's statement may be found in some recent
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the court's reasoning are the unreliability of eyewitness identification
and the grave potential for intentional or unintentional suggestion in
the way suspects are presented to witnesses at a lineup.2 4
Under certain circumstances there could be as much prejudicial influence in the display of photographs as in a lineup. 25 In such a case the
reasoning of the Supreme Court that made a lineup a critical stage of
the proceedings could be applied to a post-arrest photographic identification proceeding.26 Because neither the accused nor his counsel would
decisions of that court. Even before Wade a voice identification by the prosecuting
witness without a physical confrontation or comparison with other voices was held
to violate due process. Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966). This decision
was the only case cited by the Supreme Court in establishing the "totality of circumstances" test. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). See note 14 supra. In United
States v. Marson, 408 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1968), the Stovall test was applied to a
photographic identification and no deprivation of due process was found. This was a
pre-Wade identification, and in such cases, other courts have also applied Stovall. See
Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); United States v. Lipowitz, 407 F.2d 597
(3d Cir. 1969); Hemphill v. United States, 402 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Lesoine v.
Commonwealth, 209 Va. 399, 164 S.E.2d 642 (1968).
In two recent per curiam decisions the defendants claimed that their pretrial identifications were prejudicial and, hence, a denial of due process. United States v.
Anderson, 406 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v. Davis, 407 F.2d 846 (4th Cir.
1969). In examining the facts carefully in both cases, the court found no violation
of due process. Neither case dealt with right to counsel and both were decided
under due process standards.
In Collins the Fourth Circuit was again faced with the argument of right to counsel
at photographic identifications, which it avoided in United States v. Marson, 408 F.2d
644 (4th Cir. 1968). See note 11 supra. Having decided recent lineup cases under
due process standards, the Fourth Circuit attacked Collins' identification in the same
manner. After stating counsel would be required to prevent a breach of due process,
the majority then proceeded into a discussion of whether due process was violated
when the pictures were shown to the witnesses. Wade and Gilbert did not encompass
a due process argument. The Fourth Circuit should have used more care to distinguish between Collins' right to counsel argument and his due process argument.
24 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-36 (1967). The Supreme Court also noted
that a witness having once identified a suspect is hesitant to go back on his word,
and that the accused's fate can be sealed at a pretrial identification. Id. at 229, 235.
25
See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1968); United States v.
Trivette, 284 F. Supp. 720, 721-23 (D.D.C. 1968); State v. Thompson, - Nev. -,
451 P.2d 704, 706

(1969); P.
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74-77 (1965).
26See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 H,,v. L. Rsv. 69, 181 (1967); 43 N.Y.U.
L. Rv. 1019 (1968) (Counsel should be present at photographic displays after the
accused is in custody because of the great possibility of prejudice.). Even the prosecution in Wade admitted there was no meaningful distinction between photographic
identifications and lineup identifications. Brief for Appellant at 14, United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). One authority states that the right to counsel "is unquestioned at and during the trial stage, and even before and after this critical period,
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be present, there could be no way to show at trial that there were un-

conscious suggestions made to the witnesses. Blatant suggestiveness,
however, could be brought out at trial when the identification witnesses
are examined by the court and defense counsel to determine the basis

for their identification.
The Fourth Circuit dealt with a situation where there was no evi-

dence of prejudice in the record at all. This was emphatically pointed
out by the court on several occasions. Yet Collins called on the court

to establish a rule that counsel is required at a post-arrest display of
photographs for identification purposes. The Fourth Circuit, however,
refused to set up a per se rule in the absence of facts warranting the
28
establishment of such a rule.

If the tenet is adopted that Wade applies to all pretrial identification

procedures29 fraught with the same dangers as a lineup, then Collins
e.g. at any identification, lineup, or analogous compelled situation ....
" (emphasis
added). M. FoRKoscH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 501 (2d ed. 1969).
27 Identification by photograph is at least as unreliable as physical identification. See
63 Nw. U.L. REv. 251, 258 (1968). The reasons stated in note 20, supra, could also
be applied to a photographic identification to make it a critical stage. In addition, with
photographs there is the problem that the witness may retain in his mind's eye the
image in the photograph rather than the person he actually saw. See Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1968); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
235-36 (1967); United States v. Johnson, 412 F.2d 753, 754 (1st Cir. 1969).
Few cases have arisen dealing with photographic identification after the accused is in
custody. Several of these have assumed Wade applied but were decided upon other
bases. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 7 Md. App. 344, 255 A.2d 459 (1969); State v. Carrothers, 79 N.M. 347, 443 P.2d 517 (1968).
The Nevada Supreme Court recently held that Wade and Gilbert apply to photographic identifications held in lieu of a lineup. State v. Thompson, - Nev. -, 451
P.2d 704 (1969). Another recent case involved a factual situation similar to that presented in Collins. The accused was in custody for assault and kidnapping when the
victim identified him from a photograph of the suspect in a lineup. The picture was
made specifically for viewing by the witness, and no counsel was present when the
photograph was taken. The California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, held the
accused had no right to. counsel at the photographic identification because Vade and
Gilbert applied only to physical confrontations and not the viewing or the preparation
of the photographs. People v. Lawrence, 276 A.C.A. 359, 81 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1969).
Accord, United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969); People v. Padgitt, 264
Cal. App. 2d 443, 70 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1968); Baldwin v. State, 5 Md. App. 22, 245 A.2d
98 (1968).
Most cases concern pre-arrest identifications by photograph. See, e.g., Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); United States v. Butler, 405 F.2d 395 (4th Cir.
1968);
United States v. Clark, 289 F. Supp. 610 (E.D.Pa. 1968).
2
8 In recent cases involving the rights of a criminal defendant, the Supreme Court
has laid down per se rules only in cases where the facts have shown prejudice
toward the defendant. See cases cited note 5 supra.
29 For discussion as to the practical problems involved in extending Wade and
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can lead to an evasion of the Wade rule. The Fourth Circuit refused to
adopt such a tenet and strictly construed Wade and Gilbert to apply
only to lineups. These decisions, it was held, apply only to the peculiar
features of a congregation of people in a lineup. Counsel is required
at a lineup to prevent any prejudice in the way the suspects are presented to the witnesses. In Collins that danger is considerably weakened
by proof that the presentation of the suspect at the lineup was impartial. Of course, witnesses may be clued when the pictures are displayed. By the same token, the witnesses to a lineup may be coached
before they reach the stationhouse. In both cases the defendant should
have the burden of showing he was prejudiced by what transpired between the authorities and the witnesses. Any prejudice could only be
brought out, if at all, during the trial when the sources of the witnesses'
identifications are examined. Admittedly, this is a heavy burden to place
on the defendant, but the line must be drawn somewhere. Recent Supreme Court decisions3" have required the authorities not to engage
in any activity that might prejudice the accused. Any extension of
Wade and Gilbert to pretrial photographic identification procedures
customarily held outside the presence of counsel should be made by
the Supreme Court, and then only on facts that warrant such an extension. a
J..C.

Gilbert to all pretrial identifications, see 14 Vrm. L. Ray. 535 (1969). For discussion
of the impact of these cases on pretrial identification procedures, see Comment,
The Right to Counsel at Lineups: Wade and Gilbert in the Lower Courts, 36 U. CH.
L.R v. 830 (1969).
80 See cases cited note 5 supra.
31
State v. Thompson, - Nev. -, 451 P.2d 704, 708 (1969) (dissent by Collins,

C.J.).

Constitutional Law-LoNG HAIR BAs

IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS-Griffin

v.

Tatum and Crews v. Clones

The fourteenth amendment's guaranties of substantive due process
and equal protection require laws and governmental acts to be reasonable
and substantially related to legitimate government objectives.' Under
the reasonableness test, 2 judges are theoretically not to consider their
own opinions as to the wisdom or desirability of a law,' but they are
merely to determine whether it is arbitrary or capricious. 4 However,
reasonableness as a standard of constitutionality involves a considerable
degree of subjective judgment which cannot be divorced from the particular judge's social and political beliefs.
Restrictions and bans on students in public schools come within the
test of reasonableness. 5 The courts agree that school restrictions, in
order to fall outside of the scope of protected student rights, must be
reasonable and necessary for appropriate order and discipline, 6 or for
1 Oriental Boulevard Co. v. Heller, 58 Misc. 2d 920, 297 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
A law or regulation must be reasonable in relation to its subject, classification, and goal.
See Defiance Milk Products Co. v. Du Mond, 309 N.Y. 537, 132 N.E.2d 829 (1956);
Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Elec. Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 128 N.E.2d 691 (1955); Jack
Lincoln Shops, Inc. v. State Dry Cleaners' Bd., 192 Okla. 251, 135 P.2d 332 (1943).
See generally Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933). But cf. Sproles v. Binford, 286
U.S. 374, 388 (1932).
2
Reasonableness is the essence of substantive due process. See Board of Educ. v.
Bentley, 383 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. 1964); Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W.
510 (1924); McLeod v. State, 154 Miss. 468, 122 So. 737 (1929).
3
Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923); Board of Educ. v. Bentley,
383 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. 1964); Oriental Boulevard Co. v. Heller, 58 Misc. 2d 920, 297
N.Y.S. 431 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Defiance Milk Products Co. v. Du Mond, 309 N.Y. 537,
132 NZE.2d 829 (1956).
4
See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
See Robinson v. Board of Educ. of St. Mary's County, 143 F. Supp. 481 (D. Md.
1956); Fertich v. Michener, 111 Ind. 472, 11 N.E. 605 (1887). See generally Dove v.
Parham, 181 F. Supp. 504 (E.D. Ark. 1960), aff'd, 282 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1960); Holt v.
Raleigh Bd. of Educ., 164 F. Supp. 853 (E.D.N.C. 1958), aff'd, 265 F.2d 95 (4th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959).
6
See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)); Westly v. Rossi,
305 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969); Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass.
1969); Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Ferrell v. Dallas Independent
School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd, 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968); State ex rel. Ronish v School Dist. No. 1, 136 Mont.
453, 348 P.2d 797 (1960).
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the protection of the rights of others,7 or for the health and safety of
students. 8 One of the most controverted areas of school bans deals with
students who have unusually long hair.
In Griffin v. Tatum9 a high school student was suspended for refusing to cut his hair to the regulation length. The school maintained that
long hair was distracting and that it generated resentment by other
students who disliked nonconformity. The court concluded that the
hair restriction was arbitrary and violative of the fourteenth amendment, and held that the school's justification completely failed under
the test of reasonableness.
Crews v. Cloncs' likewise involved the suspension of a high school
boy for not conforming to the school's hair length regulation. In this
case the court relied primarily on statements of school authorities that
long hair results in disruption and health problems as justification for
the regulation. The court held that the rule against long hair was not
arbitrary or unreasonable, and that it did not violate the student's rights
of substantive due process and equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment."1
Despite the adherence of both Griffin and Crews to the standard of
reasonableness, the two courts do not agree as to what this really means
in terms of justification in a factual situation, a divergence which is
typical of other long hair cases.' 2 Since a judge has great individual
latitude to determine what is reasonable, and since there are no United
States Supreme Court decisions on long hair bans,' 3 the *permissible
length of a student's hair may depend upon where his school is located.
In the early cases on student rights the courts were reluctant to strike
7

Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). See Blackwell v.
Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
8 See cases cited note 6 supra.
9 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
10 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
"lThe court maintained that no harm would result to the student's personality or
individuality if he were forced to conform. /d. at 1377.
12 See Westly v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969); Richards v. Thuiston, 304
F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969); Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis.'1969); Davis
v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E). La. 1967), aff'd, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969);
Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist. 261 F. Supp. 545 (ND. Tex. 1966), aff'd, 392
F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968); Leonard v. School Comm.
of Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
13 However, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case that sustained
a long hair ban as a reasonable exercise of discretionary authority. Ferrell v. Dallas
Independent School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966), aft'd, 329 F.2d 697
(5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968).
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down school regulations. In those cases, a rule forbidding the use of
cosmetics, transparent hosiery, and low-necked dresses, 14 and rules requiring students to wear prescribed uniforms' 5 were sustained as constitutional. Later cases showed a greater willingness of the courts to
critically examine school regulations for abuses of discretion, but the
courts have always refused to encroach on the proper exercise of discretionary authority by school officials.' 6
The issue of whether a student can determine the length of his own
hair is not a trivial matter, 1 since the vigilant defense of freedoms is
especially important in public schools where youth are prepared to be
productive members of our democracy.:' Indeed, the guidance of students should reflect a microcosm of our free society and not be confined in a straitjacket of conformity. 19 Experience with diversity and
adaptation to differences are more important to the survival of our
system than striving for homogeneity. 0
At a time when many educational institutions are faced with turmoil,
some courts may be feeding the fires of discontent by accepting flimsy
justification for long hair restrictions. If students find constitutional
rights or fundamental liberties being treated lightly in public schools,
they may discount vital principles of our democracy as mere platitudes. 2' Far less drastic measures than suspending the students or forcing
them to conform to an official hair standard can be taken by schools,
14 Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923).
15 A requirement of an agricultural high school that students wear a uniform at school
and public places within a five mile radius of the school, even on Saturday and
Sunday, was sustained as reasonable. Jones v. Day, 127 Miss. 136, 89 So. 906 (1921). A
rule which forced state college students to wear an official uniform was sustained as a
proper exercise of school authority. Connell v. Gray, 33 Okla. 591, 127 P. 417 (1912).
0
See cases cited note 12 supra.
17 See Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
'sSee Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487
(1960). See generally Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (dictum).
19 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (dictum). In support of this view
Mr. Justice McReynolds, delivering the opinion of the court, said that "[in order to
submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males at seven
into barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and training to official guardians.
Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius, their
ideas touching the relation between individual and State were wholly different from
those upon which our institutions rest. . . ." Id. at 402. See cases cited note 18 supra;
West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
20 Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 709 (W.D. Wis. 1969) (dictum).
21
See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (dictum).
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as pointed out in Griffin,2 2 to remedy problems allegedly caused by

long hair.
J.P.S.

22 "If combing hair or passing combs in classes is distracting, the teachers, in the
exercise of their authority, may stop this without requiring that the head be shorn.
If there is congestion at the girls' mirrors, or if the boys are late for classes because
they linger in the restrooms grooming their hair, appropriate disciplinary measures
may be taken to stop this without requiring a particular hair style. If there is any
hygienic or other sanitary problem in connection with those students who elect to
wear their hair longer than that presently permitted by the regulation there are ways
to remedy this other than by requiring their hair shorn. The same is true of their
failure to participate in the physical education programs. As to the fear that some
students might take action against the students who wear hair longer than the regulation now permits, suffice it to say that the exercise of a constitutional right cannot
be curtailed because of an undifferentiated fear that the exercise of that right will
produce a violent reaction on the part of those who would deprive one of the
exercise of that constitutional right." Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60, 63 (MD.
Ala. 1969).

Federal Courts-DIVERSITY

OF CITIZENSHIP-APPOINTMENT

oF-STATE ADMINISTRATOR-Lester

V.

OF OUT-

McFaddon

When litigation is commenced between parties of different states,
diversity of citizenship exists as a basis for federal jurisdiction.' Although many artificial methods of manufacturing diversity have been
created,2 the federal courts have refused to take jurisdiction unless the
nature of the diversity is purely interstate.8 In order to facilitate the
federal courts in screening out improper diversity situations, Congress
enacted § 1359 of the Judicial Code,4 requiring a federal district court
to refuse jurisdiction when ". . . any party, by assignment or otherwise,
has been improperly or collusively 5 made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court."
Recently, in the case of Lester v. McFaddon, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals raised sua sponte a jurisdictional question involving
the interpretation of § 1359. A mother and child were struck by the
defendant's vehicle, resulting in the mother's death. The accident occurred in South Carolina and all the parties involved were residents
thereof. The child and the deceased's statutory beneficiaries, also residents of South Carolina, procured the appointment of a Georgia attorney as administrator of the estate for the purpose of bringing a
128 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1964). District courts are granted original jurisdiction of civil
actions in which the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000 and is between:

"(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or subjects thereof; and
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens thereof
are additional parties."
See C. WRIGHr, FEDERAL CouaTs § 23 (1963)

for a discussion of why diversity of

citizenship was allowed as a basis for federal jurisdiction.
2 See Cohan and Tate, Manufacturing Federal Diversity jurisdiction by the Appointment of Representatives: Its Legality and Propriety, 1 VILL. L. REv. 201 (1956).
3See Miller & Lux, Inc. v. East Side Canal Co., 211 U.S. 293 (1908); Lehigh Mining
& Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327 (1895). See generally Wright, The Federal CourtsA Century After Appomattox, 52 A.B.A.J. 742, 743 (1966).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964). This section has existed in its present form only since the
1948 revision of the Judicial Code, but its purposes and content strongly parallel its
predecessors.
5
See Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784, 788 (3d Cir. 1959) (very literal
meaning given). Contra, Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823 (1969). The
word "collusion" is a strong one. See 1 ViLL. L. Ry. 201, 245-47 (1956).
6 415 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1969).
7 The question of jurisdiction was not raised in the district court.
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wrongful death action in the federal courts. s After consideration of the
administrator's authority and duties, the court claimed to find no substantive interest on the part of the administrator.9 Therefore, the court
concluded that the appointment was secured solely for the purpose of
invoking federal jurisdiction, thereby violating § 1359.1o

Prior to Lester, the Fourth Circuit had not decided any jurisdictional
question involving the interpretation of § 1359. The court, however,
was prompted to hold the appointment collusive because of the recently
decided case of McSparran v. Weist in the Third Circuit.12 In that
case the court held that the appointment of a nonresident guardian for
the purpose of creating diversity of citizenship was collusive within
the meaning of § 1359.1' Until the decision in the Third Circuit, diversity jurisdiction had never been defeated simply because one of the
parties was a nonresident representative chosen solely to create jurisdiction.' 4 The federal courts reasoned that to look beyond the state
8
In South Carolina an action for wrongful death may be maintained only by an
executor or administrator of the decedents estate. The cause of action inheres in the
personal representative, and the statutory beneficiaries cannot proceed in their own
names. Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d 1101, 1103 (4th Cir. 1969). See S.C. CODE AaN.
§ 10-1952 (1962).
9 Because the decedent's general estate had no assets, Lester had no duties to perform prior to the suit. Therefore, unless some damages were recovered, his duties
would have been nonexistent. Even in the event of recovery, ".... his duty is limited
to receipt of the funds and their disbursement to a guardian of the statutory beneficiaries." Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d 1101, 1103 (4th Cir. 1969).
' 0 See generally Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823 (1969). There an
assignment was made for the sole purpose of creating diversity of citizenship. The
assignment was held collusive within the scope of § 1359. The court, however, reserved the question of "whether, in cases in which suit is required to be brought by
an administrator or guardian, a motive to create diversity jurisdiction renders the
appointment of an out-of-state representative 'improper' or 'collusive"' within the
meaning of § 1359." Id. at 828 n.9.
"1402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969), noted in 44 N.Y.U.
L. Rnv. 212 (1969), 73 DicK. L. Rxv. 562 (1969), 44 NonM DAME LAW. 643 (1969),
47 N.C.L. REv. 926 (1969). The petitioner admitted that the appointment of a nonresident guardian was sought for the sole purpose of creating diversity.
12 Recently, the Second Circuit held that the appointment of a nonresident administrator for the purpose of bringing a wrongful death action did not create diversity
jurisdiction. O'Brien v. AVCO Corp., ... F.2d ... (2d Cir. 1969).
IS The court stated that ".... a nominal party designated simply for the purpose of
creating diversity of citizenship, who has no real or substantial interest in the dispute or controversy, is improperly or collusively named." McSparran v. Weist, 402
F.2d 867, 873 (3d Cir. 1968).
14 See Lang v. Elm City Constr. Co., 217 F. Supp. 873 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 324 F.2d
235 (2d Cir. 1963); County of Todd v. Loegering, 297 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1961);
Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784 (3rd Cir. 1959); McCoy v. Blakely, 217
F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1954); Jaffe v. Philadelphia W.R.R., 180 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950);
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appointment would involve the examination of motive, traditionally
considered beyond judicial investigation in the area of federal diversity
jurisdiction. 1 5 As a result, in order to invoke federal jurisdiction it
was only necessary that a representative be properly appointed and
have the power to bring the action in his own name."0 It is well established by both statute and case law that an administrator is the real
party in interest, in the sense of entitlement to proceed in his own name
without joining the beneficiaries. 17 Coupling this fact with the refusal
of courts to examine motive, the federal courts had no alternative but
to discount the possibility of any impropriety or collusion, thereby
giving § 1359 a very broad interpretation in the area of appointments.,
Manufactured Federal Diversity Jurisdiction and Section 1359, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 706
(1969). See generally Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931) (avoidance of federal jurisdiction); Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928) (dictum).
15See Lang v. Elm City Constr. Co., 324 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1963); Jamison v. Kammerer, 264 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1959); Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc, 264 F.2d 784 (3d
Cir. 1959). Contra, Steinberg v. Toro, 95 F. Supp. 791 (D.P.R. 1951) (involved the
examination of motive in connection with an assignment). See generally Lehigh
Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327 (1895). The court held there that reincorporation for the purpose of creating diversity was collusive. The decision turned not
on motive, however, but on the fact that the transfer was "feigned and merely colorable." See also Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
& Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928) (reincorporation for valid reasons); National Sur.
Corp. v. Inland Properties, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
That it would be a collateral attack upon the state court was one rationale behind
the courts not inquiring into motive. See Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284
U.S. 183 (1931); Esposito v. Emery, 402 F.2d 878 (3d Cir. 1968) (dissent); Silvious v.
Helmick, 291 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.W. Va. 1968). Contra, Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d
1101 (4th Cir. 1969), where Judge Haynsworth, speaking for the court in rebutting the
argument of collateral attack, said:
Nor does it seem to us to matter in the least that the administrator owes his
appointment to the decree of a probate court. . . . That decree is not under
attack. The appoinment may be assumed to be valid in every respect and the
administrator perfectly free to prosecute the action in the state court. The
uestion here is simply whether from the circumstances of his appointment..
the statute proscribes his proceeding in the federal courts rather than in the
state courts. That seems clearly a federal question, the answer to which need
not be influenced by the fact that the state court has authorized him to proceed
in the litigation ....
id. at 1105.
160Cases cited note 15 supra.
17 FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) (Cum. Supp. 1969) provides: "Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor, administrator [or]
guardian . . . may sue in his own name without joining with him the party for whose
benefit the action is brought...." See Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429
(1903) (general guardian); Childress v. Emory, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 642 (1823)
(executors); Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 306 (1808). But cf.
Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1949).
18 See Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1969); 3A J. MooRE, FEDERAL
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McSpmrran signaled the abrupt and surprising reversal of this policy.
The court was of the opinion that, in view of the language of § 1359,
motive could not possibly be ignored in ascertaining the purpose for
which the representative was selected. Once removing this self-imposed
blinder, the court was able to look beyond the state appointment and
take cognizance of the fact that the appointment was admittedly sought

for the sole purpose of creating diversity. 19
Both Lester and McSparran advocate the use of a subjective test in
determining whether actual diversity exists.20 In applying such a test,
however, the federal courts would have to determine the intent of
the party or parties who sought to have an out-of-state executor or
administrator appointed. "While purporting to abolish the 'manufacture' of diversity jurisdiction, [a subjective test] would elevate such
manufacturing to an art difficult to define and even more difficult to
combat." 21 The citizenship of the beneficiary or decedent, rather than
the personal representative, should be the test of diversity. 22 This pro1 17.05, at 165 (2d ed. 1968). Moore states that "[it]he intent of 28 USC
S 1359 has been negated in cases allowing the manufacture of diversity by the appointment of representatives. The fact that full disclosure of the motivation is made to both
the appointing state court and the federal court should not save the appointment from
being 'improper' within § 1359." See McSparran v. "Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cit. 1968).
The court felt that possible collusion could not be overlooked simply because the
guardian was procedurally the real party in interest. See generally Martineau v. City
of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949).
19 McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968). "Whether in an individual case
diversity jurisdiction is 'manufactured' is, of course, a question of fact. Here 'manufactured' diversity [was] conceded, but in other cases where it is not conceded it will
be for the district court to make the factual determination." Id. at 876. The factual
determination of which the court speaks is equated with the examination of motive.
Accord, Gilchrist v. Strong, 299 F. Supp. 804 (,V.D. Okla. 1969) (administrator);
Ferrara v. Philadelphia Labs., Inc., 272 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Vt. 1967) (transfer of cause
of action).
20 The mere examination of motive by the federal court makes the test a subjective
one. It had been objective in that the federal courts had not looked beyond the state
appointment.
"It is unnecessary here to review the history of the problem [manufactured diversity]
or the general reasons which lead us to our conclusion for they are fully developed
in McSparran. We adopt the reasoning of the majority opinion . . .in that case."
Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d 1101, 1104 (4th Cir. 1969).
21 Esposito v. Emery, 402 F.2d 878, 882 (3d Cir. 1968) (dissent by Biggs, J.).
22 A.L.I.: SrTUY OF THE DwlsoN OF JmusDIcTIoN BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS,
pt. I, Proposed § 1301(b) (4) (Official Draft 1965). The appointment of a nonresident
representative is quite common. The institute's detailed study indicated that of all the
diversity cases filed in Pennsylvania during 1958 and 1959, 20.5% of them were
brought by out-of-state personal representatives of Pennsylvania citizens against
Pennsylvania defendants. See Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law
Institute, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1968).
PtcT-c
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posal would create an objective rule, independent of the motivation of
the parties, and would result in the elimination of manufactured diversity suits, thereby significantly reducing the federal court dockets.
An objective test would, however, deny diversity jurisdiction when
the appointment of an out-of-state administrator was sought in good
faith. 23 Nevertheless, the traditional explanation for the creation of
diversity of citizenship, that being fear of local prejudice against outof-state litigants, is no longer tenable. 24 There is today no more protection afforded a party in a federal than a state court, so the nonresident representative would not be prejudiced by seeking his remedy
in a state court.
M.A.S.

23 See 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.05, at 166 (2d ed. 1968).
21See Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REv. 483,

510 (1928).

See generally Summers, Analysis of Factors That Influence Choice of

Forumn in Diversity Cases, 47 IowA L. REv. 933 (1962).

Divorce-SEPARATIoN

WITHOUT

FAULT-POsT-NUPTIAL

INSANITY-

Crittenden v. Crittenden
Divorce in this country is based solely on statutory grounds.' In
keeping with the common law doctrine of recrimination, 2 divorce was
originally granted only to the spouse who was without faultY Today,
however, there is a trend toward liberalization in the policy underlying
divorce law, 4 and over one-half of the states recognize living "separate
and apart" as a ground for divorce."
In Crittenden v. Crittenden' the unqualified requirement of living
"separate and apart" was construed in a factual context in which the
direct cause of the marital separation was the insanity of the wife. The
parties had lived together as husband and wife until the date of the
wife's commitment to a state hospital for mental incompetence.- Since
the separation resulted from her commitment, the wife was held to be
incapable, as a matter of law, of being conscious of the fact that a
separation had occurredY Therefore, in order for the living "separate
1

See Dennis v. Dennis, 68 Conn. 186, 36 A. 34 (1896); Otis v. Bahan, 209 La. 1082,
26 So. 2d 146 (1946); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 187 Mich. 68, 153 N.W. 8 (1915);
Kasal v. Kasal, 227 Minn. 529, 35 N.W.2d 745 (1949); Pretlow v. Pretlow, 177 Va. 524,
14 S.E.2d 381 (1941); Huff v. Huff, 73 W.Va. 330, 80 S.E. 846 (1914).
2 "Recrimination is the outrageous legal principle which ordains that when both
spouses have grounds for divorce, neither may have a decree." H. CLARK, LAw OF
DoA.snrc RELATIONS § 12.12 (1968). See generally Beamer, Recrimination in Divorce
Proceedings,10 KAN. CrrY L. REv. 213 (1942).
3 See, e.g., Riesland v. Riesland, 186 Ore. 227, 206 P.2d 96 (1949); Brewies v. Brewies,
27 Tenn. App. 68, 178 S.W.2d 84 (1943); McFarland v. McFarland, 179 Va. 418, 19
S.E.2d 77 (1942).
4 Within the past decade Alabama, Colorado, Virginia, and Delaware have enacted
legislation making living "separate and apart" a ground for divorce.
5
The following statute is representative:
A divorce from the bond of matrimony may be decreed:
(9) On the application of either party if and when the husband and wife have
lived separate and apart without any cohabitation and without interruption for
two years. A plea of res ajudicata or of recrimination with respect to any other
provision of this section shall not be a bar to either party obtaining a divorce
on this ground. VA. CoDa AsN. § 20-91(9) (Cum. Supp. 1968).
For a catalog of jurisdictions with similar statutes, see AM. Ju. 2d DESK Boor,
Doc. No. 125 (1969 Cum. Supp.). For a discussion of this type of statute, see
Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REv. 32 (1966).
See also 1 U. RicH. LAW NoTEs 330 (1962).
6 210 Va. 76, 168 SE.2d 115 (1969).
7The parties were married in 1941. The defendant was committed in May, 1950.
The parties have lived separate and apart from that time, and plaintiff initiated his
divorce suit in February, 1967.
6 The court felt this conclusion to be inescapable, but its reasoning therefor is not
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and apart" to be within the meaning of the statutory language, both
spouses must be of such mental competence as to be conscious of the
fact that a separation has occurred.
When living "separate and apart" is construed as requiring a voluntary act by both parties, insanity is clearly a bar to a suit for divorce
on that ground.9 The same result is obtained by an interpretation
that the spouses must live separate and apart because of their mutual
purpose to do so, or because one party so determined and the other
acquiesced.' 0 Living "separate and apart" has been construed as requiring a voluntary act of the spouses only at the inception of the
separation, in which case the subsequent insanity of one party during
the running of the statutory period does not bar a divorce." When the
plain language of the living "separate and apart" requirement is left
unencumbered by judicial qualification, however, and when its terms
are given effect, then insanity, even at the inception of the separation,
will not bar a subsequent divorce.' 2 Such a result is both in harmony
with the stated purpose of the statutory language,' 3 and in keeping with
the liberal construction given to remedial statutes.' 4
clear from the opinion. Crittenden v. Crittenden, 210 Va. 76, 78, 168 S.E.2d 115, 116
(1969). Certainly an insane spouse may be quite capable, as a matter of fact, of
being conscious of a separation from her marital partner.
Not only is insanity not a ground for divorce in Virginia, but it also is a bar to
any divorce suit based on fault. Therefore, the plaintiff in Crittenden can obtain
no relief from his marital dilemma in Virginia courts.
The question presented in Crittenden is not limited to jurisdictions, such as Virginia,
which recognize the divorce ground of living "separate and apart," but do not grant
divorce on the ground of insanity. In jurisdictions which grant divorce on both
grounds, the sane spouse may desire to take advantage of a shorter statutory time requirement for living "separate and apart." Knabe v. Berman, 234 Ala. 433, 175 So.
354 (1937). In addition, proof of insanity may involve difficult evidentiary problems not
present in proof of living "separate and apart."
9
See Wilder v. Wilder, 207 Ark. 414, 181 S.W.2d 17 (1944); Carlson v. Carlson, 198
Ark. 231, 128 S.W.2d 242 (1939).
10See Messick v. Messick, 177 Ky. 337, 197 S.W. 792 (1917); Ferguson v. Ferguson,

8 Ky. L. Rptr. 428 (1886) (abstract).
11 Vincent v. Le Doux, 146 La. 144, 83 So. 439 (1919). The statute required that the
spouses live separate and apart for seven years. The wife was committed three years
after the commencement of the separation. At the end of the statutory period the
plaintiff was granted a divorce.
12 Knabe v. Berman, 234 Ala. 433, 175 So. 354 (1937).
The court acknowledged that
insanity would bar a divorce on any ground which required a voluntary act, but then
observed that the statute contained no such qualification: "So that it can have no effect
on her [plaintiff's] rights in this respect whether he is sane or insane, if its terms are
given effect." Id. at 434, 175 So. at 355.
13 "The object [of the statute] is to put an end to a situation of the parties which
is barren of good, capable of evil, and probably irremediable by any other means."
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The living "separate and apart" provision is not grounded on the
fault of either party.1 In many instances the admittedly guilty party,
in terms of the traditional fault approach to divorce, has taken advantage of this divorce provision in order to liberate himself from an
unwanted marital relationship.' 6 The avowed purpose of the statutory
language is to put an end in law to marriages which have ceased in
fact. 7 This purpose is as applicable, if not more so, to a marriage which
has in fact been terminated by the insanity of one of the spouses.
The reluctance of the courts to apply the living "separate and apart"
provisions to separations caused by insanity cannot be explained on a
basis of public policy.' Six years before Crittenden the intervening
insanity of a deserting spouse was held not to be a bar to a divorce. 9
Nor can the court's reluctance be based on the fear that the insane
spouse will become a financial charge on the state if the marital ties
are dissolved. The Crittenden court had the express authority to pro20
vide for the maintenance of the insane spouse.
Barrington v. Barrington, 206 Ala. 192, 193, 89 So. 512, 513 (1921).
14 See generally Sachs v. Ohio Nat'l Ins. Co., 131 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1942); Ayers v.
Parker, 15 F. Supp. 447 (D. Md. 1936); State ex rel. Cooper v. Coleman, 138 Fla.
520, 189 So. 691 (1939); Zehender & Factor, Inc. v. Murphy, 386 Ill. 258, 53 N.E.2d
944 (1944); State v. Pullen, 58 R.I. 294, 192 A. 473 (1937); City of Mason v. West Texas
Util. Co., 150 Tex. 18, 237 S.W.2d 273 (1951); Findlay v. National Union Indem. Co.,
85 1Utah 110, 38 P.2d 760 (1934).
5See Clark v. Clark, 21 Ky. L. Rptr. 955, 53 S.W. 644 (1899); Matysek v. Matysek,
212 Md. 44, 128 A.2d 627 (1957); Spray v. Spray, 368 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963);
Hagen v. Hagen, 205 Va. 791, 139 S.E.2d 821 (1965); Canavos v. Canavos, 205 Va. 744,
139 S.E.2d 825 (1965).
11See, e.g., Goudeau v. Goudeau, 146 La. 742, 84 So. 39 (1920); Matysek v. Matysek,
212 Md. 44, 128 A.2d 627 (1957); Fields v. Fields, 399 S.W.2d 958 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966); Robertson v. Robertson, 217 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Hagen v.
Hagen, 205 Va. 791, 139 S..2d 821 (1965). The Virginia statute specifically provides
that fault will not bar a divorce. VA. CoDE Awmi-. § 20-91(9) (Cum. Supp. 1968). See
text p. 347 and note 5 supra.
17 See Canavos v. Canavos, 205 Va. 744, 139 S.E.2d 825 (1965). See also Barrington
v. Barrington, 206 Ala. 192, 89 So. 512 (1921); Otis v. Bahan, 209 La. 1082, 26 So. 2d 146
(1946); George v. George, 56 Nev. 12, 41 P.2d 1059 (1935); Dawson v. Dawson, 62
Vyo. 519, 177 P.2d 200 (1947).
IS The Crittenden court has applied the statutory provision which directs that insanity commencing after desertion shal not be a bar to a divorce suit based on
desertion. VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-93 (1960). If this principle is extended, the living
"separate and apart" statutory provision should be applicable when the insanity commences after the separation. See text p. 348 and note 11 supra.
19 Pollard v. Pollard, 204 Va. 316, 130 S.E.2d 425 (1963).
The defendant was adjudged insane twenty-nine days after deserting her husband. The court applied VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-93 (1960), and awarded the plaintiff a divorce after the desertion had
continued for one year.
20 In decreeing the divorce, the court has the authority to enter such further orders
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One spouse may not be prevented by the other from obtaining a
divorce under the living "separate and apart" provision, 21 regardless of
the fault of either party.22 A guilty spouse may obtain relief in every
case, except in the situation where insanity results. As a result of Crittenden, however, the remedy of the innocent marital partner of an
insane spouse is limited to either death or a judicious change of
domicil.23
G.P.R.

as it deems expedient concerning the maintenance of the parties. VA. CODE ANN. S 20-107
(Cum. Supp. 1968). In Crittenden the plaintiff had, prior to the initiation of the
divorce suit, established a trust fund to provide for the support of the defendant.
21 Hagen v. Hagen, 205 Va. 791, 139 S.E.2d 821 (1965).
22 See Canavos v. Canavos, 205 Va. 744, 139 S.E.2d 825 (1965).
23 The remedy of the spouse whose legal position is the same as that of the plaintiff
in Crittenden lies with the Virginia legislature. See note 1 supra. To this end H.B. 13
was enacted into law during the 1970 session of the Virginia General Assembly. H.B. 13
specifically provides that insanity of either party is not a bar to divorce under VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-91(9) (Cum. Supp. 1968), regardless of the date of the commencement of the
insanity. H.B. 13 is both prospective and retrospective, and will have the practical effect
of legislatively reversing Crittenden.

Some Aspects of Abortion Constitutionality-Peoplev.Belous
The early common law imparted human status to an animated but
unborn child at the quickening stage' by holding its abortion to be a
homicide. 2 By the mid-seventeenth century, however, the crime had
been relegated to the status of a grave misdemeanor.' Prior to the quick
stage, the act was no crime if the woman's consent was obtained, and
was merely a battery in the absence of consent.' Similarly, the common law as adopted in the first American jurisdictions allowed abortion until approximately the eighteenth week of pregnancy, 5 but
punished it at any later stage as a serious misdemeanor.
American dissatisfaction with the quickening distinction was one
factor leading to the enactment of penal abortion statutes," almost
every jurisdiction prohibiting abortion at any stage of pregnancy, exISee, e.g., Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 263, 266, 43 Am. Dec. 396,
397 (1845); State v. Cooper, 22 NJ.L. 52, 54, 51 Am. Dec. 248, 249 (Sup. Ct. 1849); 1
W. BLACmroNE, COMMENTARIES * 129 ("Life . . . begins in contemplation of law as
soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb.")
If a pregnant woman were sentenced to death for a crime, a plea in stay of
execution would lie if the child had quickened in the womb, but not otherwise. State
v. Cooper, 22 N.JL. 52, 57, 51 Am. Dec. 248, 252 (Sup. Ct. 1849); 4 W. BLAcKsroNF,
Co~mMENTARIEs * 395.
2

See, e.g, State v. Cooper, 22 N.JL. 52, 54, 51 Am. Dec. 248, 250 (Sup. Ct. 1849);
Evans v. People, 49 N.Y. 86, 88 (1872). Contra, Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky.
204, 210, 39Am. Rep. 227, 231 (1879).
3
'For, if a woman is quick with child, and, by a potion or otherwise, killeth
it in her womb; or, if any one beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body,
and she is delivered of a dead child, this, though not murder, was, by the ancient
law, homicide or manslaughter. But the modern law doth not look upon this offence
in quite so atrocious a light, but merely as a heinous misdemeanor." 1 W. BLAcK'
sToNE, COmmENTARIES 129; 3 E. COKE,INs-h-IuTES * 50.
4
See, e.g., State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599, 64 P. 1014 (1901); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 204, 210, 39 Am. Rep. 227, 231 (1879); Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48,
54 Am. Dec. 607, 609 (1851); Commonwealth v. Bangs, 9 Mass. 386, 387 (1812); Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 263, 265-66, 43 Am. Dec. 396, 397 (1845); State
v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52, 58, 51 Am. Dec. 248, 253 (Sup. Ct. 1849); Miller v. Bennett,
190 Va. 162, 169, 56 S.E.2d 217, 221 (1949). But see State v. Reed, 45 Ark. 333,
334 (1885); State v. Slagle, 83 N.C. 630, 632 (1880); Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa.
630, 632 (Sup. Ct. 1850).
5 "Quickening" is defined by medico-legal dictionaries as a stage of pregnancy
at which movement of the fetus is first felt by the mother, occurring between the
sixteenth and twentieth weeks. 2 J. ScmvDT,- AroraYvs' DICToI ARY oF MEDICINE 667
(1962); B. MALOY, MEDIcAl. DICTIONARY FOR LAwYRS, 598 (3d ed. 1960).
OSee generally Mills v.- Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 630, 632 (Sup. Ct. 1850).
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cept when done to save the life of the pregnant woman.7 Although the
common law offense was intended to protect the unborn child instead
of the mother,8 the American statutes indicate an intent to protect
both of them,9 as well as to uphold the rights of society. 10
California's highest court recently tested the constitutionality of
abortion under standards prescribed by recent United States Supreme
Court decisions, and concluded that the California abortion statute
abridged the rights of the pregnant citizen without sufficient justification. People v. Belous" reversed the statutory abortion conviction
of an eminent physician who referred an unmarried patient to a California abortionist after she had threatened to obtain a potentially dangerous abortion in Mexico. The court held the statute 12 void because the
essential term "necessary to preserve" had no commonly accepted
meaning'8 consistent with legislative intent 14 that did not unduly in7 Current statutes are collected in Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the
Enforcement and Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C. L. REV. 730, 734
(1968); Sands, The Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Answer to the Opposition, 13
U.CL..A.L.REv. 285, 310 (1966) (Appendix B).
8 Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689, 699 (1967) (concurring opinion);
State v. Siciliano, 21 N.J. 249, 121 A.2d 490, 495 (1956); State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L.
52, 54, 51 Am. Dec. 248, 250 (Sup. Ct. 1849).
9 People v. Gallardo, 243 P.2d 532, 536 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 1952), modified, 41 Cal. 2d
57, 257 P.2d 29 (Sup. Ct. 1953); State v. Siciliano, 21 N.J. 249, 121 A.2d 490, 495 (1956);
State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1858).
North Carolina enacted two statutes, one applicable at all stages of pregnancy
and designed for the protection of the mother, and another appplicable only after
the quickening stage is reached, designed to protect only the unborn child. State
v. Hoover, 252 N.C. 133, 113 SXE.2d 281, 283 (1960); State v. Jordan, 227 N.C.
579, 42 SZE.2d 674, 675 (1947).
Virginia's high court has expressly declared that the intention of the lawmakers
was to protect the health and lives of pregnant women and their unborn children
from those who intentionally and mala fidely would thwart nature by performing
or causing abortion and miscarriage. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 665, 673,
58 S.E.2d 72, 75 (1950).
10 See generally People v. Gallardo, 243 P.2d 532, 536 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 1952), modified, 41 Cal. 2d, 57, 257 P.2d 29 (Sup. Ct. 1953) ("designed to stay the activities of
meddling agencies bent upon disrupting the process of racial reproduction"); Miller
v. Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 169, 56 SE.2d 217, 221 (1949) ("unnecessary interruption
of pregnancy is universally regarded as highly offensive to public morals and contrary to public interest.").
1171 Cal. 2d 996, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W.
3313
(Feb. 24, 1970).
12 CAL.PEN. CODE § 274 (West 1955).
1S "Dictionary definitions and judicial interpretations fail to provide a clear meaning for the words, 'necessary' or 'preserve.' There is, of course, no standard definition
of 'necessary to preserve,' and taking the words separately, no clear meaning emerges."
People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 996, 458 P.2d 194, 198, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 358 (1969).
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fringe upon the rights of the woman to live and to choose whether
to bear children, and because it violated due process of law by delegating to the physician the responsibility of determining whether to perform the abortion. 1 In so doing, the court seemingly accorded a superior
status to the rights of the expectant mother, although the pregnancy
itself did not endanger her life, and relegated the rights of the unborn child and of society to a position of uncertainty.
The term "necessary to preserve" is included in the abortion statutes
of many jurisdictions," and has been interpreted by an intermediate
California appellate court to require the existence of a potentially
dangerous situation constituting a threat to the patient's life in order to
justify an abortion performed to remove the danger.17 Other courts
have reached similar conclusions in the few reported decisions available in which the phrase was discussed,", but apparently most courts
have found no ambiguity in the statutes employing the same language.
To the dissenting justices in Belous, the majority transform by lavish
analysis "that which is simple and lucid into something complex and
arcane." :,9

14 The legislature's intent as construed in earlier decisions did not require certainty

or immediacy of death before an abortion could be performed, but only that the
dangerous condition be potentially present. People v. Ballard, 167 Cal. App. 2d 803,
814, 335 P.2d 204, 212 (Dist. Ct. 1959).
15The court found that due process was violated because the doctor was modvated by the threat of penal sanction to refuse an abortion, and thus had a "direct,
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion that the woman
should not have an abortion." People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 996, 458 P.2d 194, 206, 80
Cal. Rptr. 354, 366 (1969). Cited to support this conclusion were Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510 (1927), holding that a system of judges' compensation in criminal cases
which resulted in greater pay upon rendition of a guilty judgment as compared with
a finding of not guilty violated due process, and State Board of Dry Cleaners v.
Thrift-O-Lux Cleaners, 40 Cal. 2d. 436, 254 P.2d 29 (1953), prohibiting legislative
delegation to an administrative board of the authority to set and enforce minimum
charges for dry cleaning without the establishment of an ascertainable standard to
guide
the board.
16
See, e.g., N.Y. PNAL CODE § 125.05(3) (McKinney 1967); Omo REv. CoDE A-"N.
§ 2901.16 (Baldwin 1964); D.C. CoDa § 22-201 (1967) ("necessary for the preservation
of the mother's life or health"); Ky. REv. STAT. § 436.020 (Baldwin, 1969).
17People v. Ballard, 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 814, 335 P.2d 204, 212 (Dist. Ct. 1959);
People v. Abarbanel, 239 Cal. App. 2d 31, 48 Cal. Rptr. 336 (Dist. Ct. 1965).
tsSee, e.g., State v. Jones, 20 Del. 109, 53 A. 858, 859 (1902); Beasley v. People,
89 II. 571, 577 (1878); Willey v. State, 46 Ind. 363, 367 (1874); Bassett v. State, 41
Ind. 303, 304 (1872); State v. Dunklebarger, 206 Iowa 971, 221 N.W. 592, 596 (1928);
Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 53 NYE.2d 4 (1944).
19 People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 996, 458 P.2d 194, 211, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 371 (1969)
(dissenting opinion). One dissenting justice reasoned that since the phrase "necessary to preserve" had been included in the statute for over one hundred years, and
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Of far greater significance, however, to the future of legislative
abortion prohibition is the court's pronouncement of the woman's right
to choose, after conception, whether to bear the child or to terminate
her pregnancy. The court derived this constitutional right from the
20
widely noted Supreme Court decision in Griswold v. Connecticut.
Griswold found a right of privacy protected by the Bill of Rights, but
failed to delineate its scope, and thus the extent to which it could

transgress upon, and thereby limit, a state's exercise of its police power.

This "zone of privacy" was found by Belous to be sufficiently broad
to override the state's interest in protection of the unborn and of

society's rights, indicating that the right of privacy may be far
broader in scope than was needed to sustain the Griswold decision.
Belous reasoned that the mother's right to life was involved because
medical statistics indicate that an early abortion, properly performed,
is less dangerous than childbirth, 21 and because a criminal abortion,

to which the pregnant woman might resort if denied a legal operation,
presents a grave danger to her life.2 2 The court did not consider that

the unborn child could assert any rights superior to the mother's right
to life, and concededly, this rationale is the basis of the exception prohad been continuously interpreted by doctors, hospital committees, judges, lawyers,
and juries during the entire period, for the court to find the language vague was a
"negation of experience and common sense.' Id. at 458 P.2d 207, 80 Cal. Rptr. 367
(dissenting opinion). Justice Sullivan declared that "One would think that the
English language which has been the sensitive instrument of our system of law for
over 500 years, has lost, by the mere passage of time, all capacity for clarity of
expression.' Id. at 458 P.2d 210, 80 Cal. Rptr. 370 (dissenting opinion).
20 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965), holding unconstitutional a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives and the dissemination of birth control information, because it ". . . operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and
their physician's role in one aspect of that relation," and thereby extended beyond
what was necessary to accomplish the desired goal, i.e., the scope of the statute exceeded the evil sought to be prevented.
21 The court's statistics do not conclusively support this allegation because the
number of abortions reported was insufficient to allow a proper sample. The court
cited a rate of 291 deaths per million births, compared with no deaths in 3,775
abortions performed in California under the new Therapeutic Abortion Act of 1967.
Yet based upon the United States rate only one death would be expected in 3,775
births; thus, the abortion experience is yet too insufficient to project the rate of
deaths from abortions. People v. Belous, 71 Cal.2d 996 n.6 & n.7, 458 P.2d 194, 199
n.6, 201 n.7, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359 n.6, 361 n.7 (1969).
22
Actually the number of deaths attributable to illicit abortions is unknown, but
a 1936 study indicated a probability of 5,000 to 10,000 annually in the United States,
as an educated guess. Niswander, Medical Abortion Practice in the United States, 17
WmSr. Rr.s. L. REv. 403, 404 (1965). Due to the availability of professional medical
treatment if complications arise, undoubtedly there are fewer deaths today even
though the total number of abortions performed is greater.
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vided in most abortion statutes allowing an abortion to save the mother's
life. However, to apply it to a situation in which the danger to the
mother is de minimis contravenes the law's trend toward greater pro25
24
tection for the unborn child in the criminal,23 tort, and property
areas.
The Virginia abortion statute does not use the term "necessary to
preserve," although it incorporates a subjective exception in similar
language, 2 1 and therefore, it is not susceptible to the same vagueness
challenge as California's statute. Virginia's position on the rights of
the unborn child - would likely incline the Supreme Court of Appeals
2 The criminal law has historically required that a child be born alive before it
can become an object of murder. Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 417, 256 S.W. 433
(1923); People v. Ryan, 9 Ill. 2d 467, 138 NZE.2d 516 (1956). However, the California
Superior Court recently upheld the validity of an indictment charging the murder
of an eight-month old fetus which was born dead. Keeler v. Superior Ct. 276 Cal.
App. 324, 80 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1969).
24 At common law, there could be no recovery on behalf of an infant, after birth,
for a negligently inflicted pre-natal injury. Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14
(1884). But see Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946), allowing recovery
based on common law principles. Since then, a number of jurisdictions have either
overruled former decisions, or ruled for the first time, and allowed recovery by
the child for pre-natal injuries. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960);
Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (Ct. App. 1951); Sinkler v. Kneale,
401 Pa. 262, 164 A2d 93 (1960). Smith v. Brennan, supra, allowed recovery although
viability at the time of the injury was not alleged. Most decisions, however, require
viability, and reject actions for injuries occurring before viability. Many decisions
allow recovery by the personal representative of a still-born infant for the wrongful
death of the child due to pre-natal injury after viability. Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23
Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167
NE.2d 106 (1959). Contra, Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165
N.E.2d 912 (1960); Graf v. Taggert, 43 NJ. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Lawrence v.
Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
2 A 1965 English decision upset precedent by allowing a contingent remainder
to vest in the unborn child at the death of his parent, although it had been an
ironclad rule that a contingent remainder would fail if it could not vest prior to the
termination of the preceding estate in an ascertainable person, eliminating the unborn. Reeve v. Long, 83 Eng. Rep. 754 (1695). American decisions similarly protected the property rights of the unborn. Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. 255 (1834) allowed an unborn child to take a legacy in favor of children living at the death of
the testator, and Barnett v. Pinkston, 238 Ala. 327, 191 So. 371 (1939) allowed a
child, after birth, to take a legacy by way of remainder to children living at the
death
of the life tenant, his father, who died t-vo months prior to the child's birth.
2
6"No person, by reason of any act mentioned in this section, shall be punishable
when such act is done in good faith, with the intention of saving the life of such
woman or child." VA. CODE Awx. § 18.1-62 (1960).
27 Miller v. Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 169, 56 SYE.2d 217, 221 (1949) expressly stated

that the statute was enacted ".

.

. not for the protection of the woman, but for

the protection of the unborn child and through it society."
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to turn a deaf ear to an argument which negated those rights, although
the Virginia court has expressly recognized that the abortion statute
was designed in part to protect the health and lives of pregnant
women, 28 and has also stated that the offense is against the mother as

well as the child.2
The third ground of unconstitutionality found in Belous, that of

delegation of legislative authority to the doctor 3 0 has not been considered by the Virginia court. However, since the Virginia statute
expressly excludes from its scope those operations performed in good
faith, 1 it would seem that a Virginia physician is not subjected to the
same sanction as is a California physician, since in Virginia subjective
good faith is an affirmative defense even though in fact the abortion
was not necessary to preserve the life of the patient. The Virginia
physician, therefore, can render a less partial decision without fear

of criminal sanction.
In view of the Belous holding, it may be expedient for other state
legislatures to consider abortion law reform, possibly as suggested by
the Model Penal Code, 32 which has been adopted with minor modifications in several jurisdictions.3' This recommended legislation relaxes the
strict prohibition present in most statutes, and allows abortion in cases
of rape or incest which result in pregnancy,34 as well as in pregnancies
28 Anderson v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 665, 673, 58 S.E.2d 72, 75 (1950).
29 Id.
30 See note 15 supra.
31
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62 (1960).
32 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); MODEL PENAL
207.11 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).

CODE

The Virginia Advisory Legislative Council recently completed a study of Virginia's abortion law, concluding that abortion should be permitted: "(1) where the
continuation of pregnancy is likely to result in the death of the mother or impair her
physical or mental health; (2) where there is substantial medical likelihood that the
child would be born with an irremedial mental or physical defect, or (3) where the
pregnancy resulted from rape, where the parties have not been thereafter married,
or incest." The Council concluded that the determination of impairment of the
mother's physical or mental health should be made solely by the medical profession,
because it was primarily a medical question. It recommended amendments to the
current statute to conform to these suggestions. VALC, VIRGaN'A's
1969.
33

AORTioN LAws

Since 1967, California, Colorado and North Carolina have enacted abortion

statutes based upon the A\oD L PENAL CODE.
34 Also included are cases of felonious intercourse, defined as illicit intercourse

with a female under sixteen. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(2) (Proposed Official Draft,
1962).
As enacted by California, the measure includes a provision to deter unfounded
claims of rape or incest. The therapeutic abortion committee, which receives the ap-
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which would likely result in birth of a seriously defective child, either
physically or mentally.3 5 Abortion is also allowed when the continuation
of the pregnancy would seriously threaten the mother's physical or
mental health.30 The proposal requires that the decision to abort be
made by at least two physicians.3 7 Whether it expands the rights of a
woman to obtain an abortion sufficiently to satisfy the Belous objections
is a question which must await future litigation.
It is likely that the Belous decision will inspire attacks upon other

abortion statutes in many jurisdictions.3 8 Hopefully, such tribunals as
may consider the issues will refrain from the abrogation of legislative
enactments of long-standing on the basis of questionable constitutional

interpretations. If the majority of public opinion is in favor of a relaxed abortion prohibition, its argument should be addressed to the

legislatures.39 Clearly, the usurpation of legislative prerogative by the
judiciary threatens our delicate system of checks and balances. The
Constitution is too inviolate a document to be distorted by tortured
40
construction on the altars of social change.
C.K.T.
plication for an abortion based upon grounds of rape or incest, must request the
approval of the district attorney of the jurisdiction wherein the alleged crime occurred. If he fails to find probable cause that the crime took place, he can refuse
permission. Leavy and Charles, California's New Therapeutie Abortion Act: An
Analysis and Guide to Medical and Legal Procedure, 15 U.C.L.A. L. RLn. 1 (1967).
85 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
361d.
3
7 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (3) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
3
BRecently, the abortion statute of the District of Columbia was declared unconstitutional. United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969). The
Virginia Advisory Legislative Council recognized in its report on abortion laws
that the United States Supreme Court is almost certain to rule on the constitutionality of similar state laws on abortion in view of the Vuitch decision. VALC,
VmmNiA's ABORTION LAWS (1969).
80 Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689, 698-99 (1967)
(concurring
opinion) declared: "Our duty in this highly charged public policy area is to say
what the law is and not what we think it ought to be. What it ought to be is a
matter for the legislative branch of the government . . . .If it is not as responsive
as the people believe contemporary life demands, the remedy rests with them and
not with the courts:'
40A New York court, in reviewing the constitutionality of a statute regulating
dissemination of contraceptive devices, declared: "The attorney . . . in the final
analysis .. .is still asitng this Court to enact new law rather than to interpret the
laws on the books. It is apparent that the defendant is basing his contentions upon
the social aspects, rather than the legal ones, but the Court cannot do what only the
Legislature can do-consider these changed social attitudes as justification to, in
effect, repeal a statute. Certainly no Judge is equipped to appraise changes in social
attitudes." People v. Baird, 47 Misc. 2d 478, 262 N.Y.S.2d 947 (Dist. Ct. 1965).

